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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION
By W. Clayton Carpenter of the Denver Bar*AT first glance the subject of this paper may seem some-
what remote from the common experience of most
lawyers, especially those of us who are located so far
from the seat of government of the United States, but if we
recall the recommendations recently adopted by the Denver
Bar Association in acting upon the report concerning the pro-
posed participation of the United States in the Permanent
Court of International Justice commonly known as the World
Court, our interest in the subject of procedure and practice in
International Arbitration may not appear merely academic.
The World Court as founded and as now in existence
approaches more nearly a permanent court than any previous
attempt to set up a continuously existing machinery for the
settlement of international disputes. There is no doubt now
growing up a very substantial body of precedents in practice
which are not found in any of the decisions of the Court, or
in its rules, and which are known only to those actively prac-
ticing before it. In the same way precedents in practice and
procedure in the past before arbitral tribunals have been
known to those actually engaged in the particular arbitra-
tions, but as the tribunals had no permanence and the counsel
and agents varied from case to case, and no permanent re-
*EDrroR's No:-Mr. Carpenter formerly was an Assistant Solicitor of the Depart-
ment of State and is thoroughly familiar with both the theoretical and practical aspects
of the subject covered in his article.
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ports readily accessible, were kept, the building up of a body
of precedents in practice and procedure has been slow and
uncertain. In European court practice it is common to refer
to preceding cases as they are reported, analyzed and discussed
in the works of jurists and scholars, and to that extent and in
that way previous experience has been preserved and made
accessible, but to the Anglo-Saxon lawyer accustomed to rely
upon the reported cases, the lack of complete reports is the
first point which impresses him in his attempt to prepare a
case for International Arbitration. No doubt this fact has
been the motive which has induced the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace to finance the preparation of the stu-
pendous work on International Arbitration, under the editor-
ship of Professor John Bassett Moore of Columbia University,
which will seek to reproduce somewhat in the form of court
reports the facts and decisions in all international arbitrations
from the days of the Greeks, ("International Adjudications,
Ancient and Modern, together with Mediatorial Reports, Ad-
visory Opinions, and the Decisions of Domestic Commissions
on International Claims: History and Documents." Year
Book of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1929, pages 175-80.) Professor Moore, during the many years
in which he was connected with the Department of State pre-
pared a work in six volumes, (Moore's Digest), covering In-
ternational Arbitrations participated in by the United States,
and this is one of the principal sources at the present time.
The Carnegie Endowment has also re-published all of
the decisions of the Permanent Court of Arbitration created
by the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the reports
of the World Court are being currently published by that
Court. These three groups of publications will give us the
most complete set of reports from which to seek precedents
in both substantive and adjective international law.
But the presentation of a claim against a foreign country
antedates, sometimes by many years, the actual submission of
thq controversy to an arbitral tribunal. While in the ordinary
practice of the law a client merely consults his attorney, lays
the facts before him and if advised that there is ground for
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action, employs the attorney to institute suit and bring the
defendant at once into court, in the case of an international
claim the client after employing his attorney must then con-
vince the Department of State of the justice and propriety of
presenting a claim against a foreign country.
The method followed in submitting a claim to the De-
partment of State is usually to consult first with the office of
the Solicitor of that Department. The Solicitor's office is
in fact a large law office now comprising some thirty attor-
neys and law clerks, acting not only in an advisory capacity
to the Department of State but advising also American citi-
zens who have matters with foreign countries. The Solicitor
of the Department of State who is the head of this office is not
an employee of that Department but is an employee of the
Department of Justice and is a subordinate of the Attorney
General, with offices in the building housing the Department
of State where he can conveniently be consulted by the officials
of that Department.
Among the subjects listed as within the jurisdiction of
this office are the drafting and preparation of treaties, claims
of American citizens against foreign governments, questions
of personal and private rights of aliens in the United States
and American citizens in foreign countries, questions arising
out of contracts between foreign governments and American
citizens, claims because of refusal or failure of officials of
foreign governments to protect American citizens and prop-
erty, questions of citizenship, naturalization, expatriation and
extradition; and questions relating to the rights and acts of
belligerents, neutrals and insurgents on land or sea. (Register
of the Dept. of State, Jan. 1, 1929, page 23.)
The office of the Solicitor is not divided as are many
private law offices of similar size into departments, each deal-
ing with but one of the many subjects above referred to. The
division is made in a different manner. It is in general geo-
graphical, and each section, headed by an Assistant Solicitor,
deals with all questions relating to that particular geographi-
cal section of the world which is allotted to him. For in-
stance one assistant solicitor covers South America, one the
Far East, one the Near East, etc. This distribution of work
corresponds substantially with the division of the Department
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of State itself into separate bureaus each of which deals with
the political affairs, and, in connection with the Bureau of
Foreign and Domestic Commerce of the Department of
Commerce, with commercial affairs concerning its particular
section of the world.
If the claim to be presented is against Peru the claimant
and his attorney consult the assistant solicitor in charge of
South America. After a preliminary conference in which it
will probably be learned that the Department of State has
hitherto heard of the claim, the claimant is required to pre-
pare and file with the Department a "memorial" which is in
effect an elaborate, detailed and verified statement of all of
the facts, accompanied by copies of all documents, affidavits,
etc., which may be referred to, and an exhaustive brief of the
law points involved, and is usually required to be furnished
in several copies in order that the Department of State may
refer one copy to its foreign representative in the country
involved for investigation. The type of the case determines
whether it is referred to the Legation or Embassy, or the
Consulate. This investigation and report frequently occupy
a number of months or even years and upon the receipt of the
report it may be necessary to make substantial modifications
of the claim. When, however, the investigation'seems to be
complete and the Department is satisfied as to the legal basis
of claim, the Department will then present the matter in the
form of a note to the representative of the foreign country
residing in Washington or will instruct the United States
Minister in the foreign country to present it to the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs of that country. The method to be
employed depends somewhat upon the personality of the
people with whom the Department is dealing and somewhat
upon the character and importance of the case.
The foreign government then makes its own investigation
and in due course replies. If the case is of importance, es-
pecially politically, it may require long negotiations, and at
times delays which are intentional for the purpose of allaying
popular feeling, or awaiting changes in administration.
The procedure of presenting a claim up to this point is
rather largely a matter of correspondence, personal inter-
views and investigations which differ in each case, but which
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are comparable with the preliminary investigation before
bringing suit in our domestic tribunals, except in the amount
of time required and the more important part played by mat-
ters of policy.
When the claim has been finally declined, another series
of negotiations is usually required to persuade the opposing
government to submit the case to arbitration, and to reduce
to final form the treaty or agreement providing therefor.
There are several types of arbitral tribunals and they
may be roughly classified as follows:
1st. Tribunals consisting of one or more judges, selected
to arbitrate a single case, created by a special treaty providing
for the particular arbitration.
2nd. Claims Commissions created by special treaty for
the purpose of hearing a great number of claims pending be-
tween two or more countries. These Commissions often con-
sist of one or more persons designated by each country, and
an umpire selected to cast the deciding vote in case of failure
of the other arbitrators to agree.
3rd. Arbitral Tribunals created under the provisions of
the Hague Conventions for the pacific settlement of inter-
national disputes, adopted by the Hague Conferences of 1899
and 1907.
4th. The Permanent Court of International Justice,
commonly designated as the World Court, created by special
treaty pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles
(Article 14).
There have been many arbitrations of the first type such
as the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries arbitration between
Great Britain and the United States just before the World
War; the dispute over the Northeastern boundary between
the United States and Great Britain submitted to the-King
of the Netherlands under the treaty of September 29, 1827;
the former being an example of submission to a court of sev-
eral arbitrators and the latter a case submitted to a single
arbitrator. (Moore's Digest, page 85; U. S. Treaties, page
835.) The former arbitration was also an example of the
third class above given.
During the last century the United States has entered
into a number of treaties for the establishment of Claims Com-
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missions for the purpose of clearing up all claims in the files
of the Department against the countries involved and avoiding
the expenses of individual arbitration which in many cases
were not justified. Probably the most famous of these is the
Commission to decide the Alabama claims arising out of the
Civil War, provided for in the treaty of Washington of 1871.
There have been several Claims Commissions with Mexico,
and after the last war three Claims Commissions were estab-
lished in Washington, the British American Claims Commis-
sion, the Mixed Claims Commission between the United
States and Germany, and the Tripartite Claims Commission
between the United States and Austria and Hungary. At the
same time there have been in existence the General and Special
Claims Commissions between the United States and Mexico.
There have been a number of cases arbitrated under the
provisions of the Hague Conference. The Pious Fund Case
between the United States and Mexico was the first and one
of the most famous for the reason that it was probably through
President Roosevelt's insistence upon the use of the Hague
Tribunal in this case that the efforts of the Hague Convention
of 1899 were not entirely lost and the machinery provided al-
lowed to drop into oblivion.
The World Court has been in existence for eight years
and has had a large number of cases considering its brief
existence and the character of the litigation which comes be-
fore it.
Claims Commissions have in the past furnished the most
completely detailed rules of procedure of any of the arbitra-
tions, and this is natural because they have been created for
the purpose of handling a large number of cases, and were
often required to complete their work within a limited- time,
and some regulations had to be established to facilitate the
handling of business.
In the case of arbitrations of individual cases submitted
to a single arbitrator or to a group of arbitrators the rules
of procedure have not been so clearly defined because many
matters were handled by compromise and negotiation between
the opposing parties in the course of the hearings as and when
they arose. This course has been very unsatisfactory because
it gave matters of procedure undue importance and very often
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influenced arbitrators unconsciously in their decision on the
merits, and correspondingly influenced agents of con-
tending countries not to urge points of procedure for fear of
annoying the arbitrators and prejudicing their respective
cases. Even before the World Court one instance is reported
where counsel insisted upon speaking fifteen hours upon a
preliminary question greatly to the annoyance of the Court
which is reported to have indicated its dissatisfaction by inf-
attention and falling asleep during the course of the argument.
(17 A. J. I. L. 306.)
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 contain sec-
tions on Arbitral Procedure which were intended to establish
permanent rules of a general character so that any arbitra-
tion agreement submitting a case under the terms of these
conventions would not need to set up rules or provide there-
for. (U. S. Treaties, 2016, 2220.) In practice, however,
additional rules have often been found necessary and have
been promulgated by the Tribunal itself after its creation,
while the Hague Convention itself provides in Article 56
that where a sovereign is named as arbitrator the procedure
shall be settled by him. The principal effect of the Hague
Conventions on international arbitration was to create a list
of judges nominated by the various countries who could al-
ways be drawn upon to act in individual arbitrations, and to
set up a framework which could be converted into an active
Court merely by the execution of an agreement submitting the
case under the conventions.
The World Court goes much farther. The statute (in
fact a treaty) creating this Court was prepared by ten jurists
of international standing, the representative of the United
States being Mr. Elihu Root. The statute and rules of pro-
cedure are therefore much more exhaustive than the treaties
or protocols creating former tribunals. Incidentally, they
also show substantial evidence of the influence of Anglo-
Saxon ideas.
Upon the organization of a commission or arbitral tri-
bunal it is customary for each government to name a secretary
and the two secretaries maintain duplicate journals or minute
books of the proceedings, which become the property of the
respective governments at the close of the arbitration. (For
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example, Mixed Commission, United States-Peru, Convention
of December 4, 1868; General Claims Commission, United
States-Mexico, Agreement of September 8, 1923; and Hague
Convention of 1907, Article 66, U. S. Treaties II, page 2220.)
The world Court statute gives that institution a more in-
dependent status and provides that the court shall have a per-
manent registrar and office. (Article 21, World Court
Statute.)
There is no international bar to which attorneys are ad-
mitted for the purpose of practice before arbitral tribunals,
or the World Court, but in each case each government desig-
nates first an agent to represent it in its dealings with the tri-
bunals; and secondly one or more counsel who participate in
the arguments before the Courts. The counsel may vary in
number and from time to time during the progress of the
case, but for authoritative commitments on the part of the
contesting governments the tribunal always deals with the
agents. (Moore's Digest, page 910; United States-Mexico
General Claims Commission, 1923; Ralston, page 192.)
The Hague Convention of 1907 provided that the con-
testing governments should appoint agents "to act as inter-
mediaries between the tribunal and themselves" and may ap-
point counsel. (Article 62, Hague Convention 1907, U. S.
Treaties II, page 2220.)
The World Court Statute, (Article 42) provides: "the
parties shall be represented by agents. They may have the
assistance of counsel or advocates before the Court".
Rule 35 of the World Court provides that when a case
is brought before the Court the documents submitting it shall
give the names of the agents of the respective parties.
In other words the agents and counsel must be qualified
for each case and are not members of an international bar
entitled to appear at any time. It is also obvious that the per-
sonal attorney of the individual claimant has no standing
whatever unless employed by the claimant government as its
agent or counsel. Formal commissions are delivered by each
government to its agents and counsel, to be exhibited before
the tribunal as evidence of their right to appear.
Before the Claims Commission of 1868 between the
United States and Mexico the United States submitted the
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claim of one Weil and an award was secured in his favor.
Thereafter the United States discovered that a large part of
the testimony had been fabricated and declined to pay the
money over to the claimant. The claimant sought a writ of
mandamus against the Secretary of State and ultimately the
case went to the Supreme Court of the United States, where
the Court held that Weil could not compel the delivery of
the award by the United States and discussed the status of a
private American citizen before an international tribunal
where his Government had undertaken to press his claim:
"As between nations the proprietary right in respect of those things
belonging to private individuals or bodies corporate within a nation's terri-
torial limits is absolute, and the rights of Weil cannot be regarded as distinct
from those of his Government. The Government assumed the responsibility
of presenting his claim, and made it its own in seeking redress in respect to
it." (U. S. ex rel. Boynton vs. Blaine, 139 U. S. 306; Moore's Digest, page
1346.)
The individual claimant therefore has no standing before
an international arbitration; the claim, internationally speak-
ing, is not his, but his government's.
When the Tribunal convenes for the hearing of cases it
has been customary for many years for the presiding judge to
make some complimentary reference to the progress of arbi-
tration when declaring the court open for the transaction of
business. Whether this prevails in sessions of the World Court
I am not advised, but a typical expression is that of the presi-
dent of a tribunal in the case of the Venezuelan Preferential
Arbitration of 1903, which is submitted for comparison with
the opening cry of the bailiff of an ordinary trial court:
"Appointed through the confidence of my esteemed colleagues to the
signal honor of presiding over the tribunal of arbitration in the question of the
recognition of the claims against the United States of Venezuela, I undertake
this charge, arduous as it is flattering, with a fervent and sincere desire to
acquit myself thereof to the best of my ability, and I declare the tribunal duly
constituted and its arbitral sittings opened by this its first meeting." (Penfield's
Report, page 44.)
One of the first difficulties upon the convening of the
tribunal is the determination of the language in which the
proceedings are to be conducted. This is usually settled
in the treaty creating the tribunal which generally gives each
DICTA
contesting party the right to use its own language. In the
Venezuelan Preferential Arbitration above referred to, how-
ever, English was specified as the official language although
ten nations were involved. The Court of its own initiative
and probably because of its greater familiarity with French,
made French also one of the authorized languages. (Pen-
field's Report, page 53.) The Tripartite Claims Commission
treaty also provides for the English language. (U. S. Treat-
ies, No. 730.) The Hague Convention contains the provision
that the language shall be fixed by the arbitration agreement
and if not so fixed shall be determined by the tribunal when
constituted. (U. S. Treaties, page 2220.) The Statute of
the World Court provides that French and English shall be
authorized unless otherwise requested by the parties.
The complaint, as ordinarily described in our domestic
practice, does not exist in the same form and name in inter-
national arbitration. In some arbitration treaties it is desig-
nated as a "memorial" and in others, especially those under
the Hague Conventions, as the "case".
The "memorial" or "case" consists of a complete verified
statement of the facts accompanied by a brief of the legal
points, and copies of all supporting documents, which include
not only what we ordinarily describe as documentary evi-
dence, but also affidavits of witnesses. The answer is called
the counter-memorial, or counter-case, and is similarly made
up except that of course it controverts certain statements and
legal arguments made in the "memorial" or "case". (United
States-Mexican Claims Commission of 1868, Moore's Digest,
page 2144; Ralston, page 191 ; difference between Continental
and American views as to contents of "case" is set forth in
article by W' C. Dennis, 7 A. J. I. L. 285, cited at close of
this paper.)
Before claims commissions, a practice of alternate plead-
ing has often been used, i. e., the case is opened by the filing of
a memorial followed by a counter memorial, and sometimes by
a reply. (Morris's Report, page 37; Moore's Digest, page
2235.) In the case of the recent General Claims Commission
between the United States and Mexico, the rules also provide
for instituting the action by merely filing a memorandum, to
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be later followed by a complete memorial. (Convention of
Sept. 8, 1923.)
Before the World Court, in those cases which may be insti-
tuted upon the application of one of the parties only, the rules
provide for alternate pleading, i. e., the complaining nation
files its case, followed by the counter case of the defendant,
and then by a reply and a rejoinder if desired.
But in all other arbitrations, and this is true still in cases
submitted to the World Court by joint action of the parties, it
is customary for the parties simultaneously to file their cases,
followed within the time specified by the simultaneous filing
of the counter cases by both parties; and sometimes by the
filing of replies by both parties. (Chamizal Arbitration,
United States-Mexico, Treaty of June 24, 1910, U. S. Treaties,
page 2729; Hague Convention of 1907, Article 63, U. S.
Treaties, page 2220.) Mr. Lester H. Woolsey, formerly
Solicitor of the Department of State during the presidency
of Mr. Wilson, points out that the historical reason for the
practice of filing cases simultaneously was the necessity of
maintaining "the fiction of equality of independent sovereign
states by not giving either party the character of plaintiff or
defendant". (21 A. J. I. L. 111.)
This practice of simultaneous pleading has been com-
plained of bitterly by Anglo-Saxon lawyers on the ground
that neither side knows what the case of the other party will
be until the counter case is filed because the opening case is
often somewhat pointless, covers unnecessary ground, and is
not fully developed until the counter case is filed and the criti-
cism of the opposing party has defined the issues.
For example, in the case of the Palmas Island Arbitra-
tion between the United States and the Netherlands the in-
efficiency of the practice of simultaneous filing of cases was
clearly revealed. The Netherlands presented a case referring
to various documents which were not attached, but which it
stated in the case could be produced if the Tribunal so desired.
The American agent criticized this action and demanded that
all supporting documents be presented with the case as re-
quired by the Hague Convention. The agent of the Nether-
lands replied that the case is in itself only an introductory
pleading and that the issues of an arbitration never are fully
DICTA
defined until the counter case is presented. The arbitrator
called upon the Netherlands to produce documents from time
to time and finally elicited sufficient evidence to decide the
case adversely to the United States. If the alternate method
of pleading had been followed it is probable that the issues
would have been clearly defined early in the proceedings, but
from the reports of the case the pleadings on the part of the
Netherlands seem to have been of little assistance to the arbi-
trator. (22 A. J. I. L., pages 735, 867.)
The rules of some of the claims commissions provide that
after the filing of the "memorial" or "case" a "general denial
thereof shall be entered of record by the secretary as of
course". (Moore's Digest, page 2227; Morris's Report, page
37.) Then further pleadings are very often dispensed with.
After the presentation of the "cases" or "memorials" and
the counter cases there have been a few cases where proceed-
ings in the nature of motions to dismiss, and demurrers have
been considered. These cases are rare and the claims com-
missions furnish most of them.
In the case of the Mexican Claims Commission of 1868
where the memorial on its face showed that the claimant was
not an American citizen the Mexican agent filed a motion to
dismiss. In the course of the argument it appeared that pos-
sibly the claimant could establish American citizenship by
naturalization. The Court stated that the complaint on its
face should be dismissed, but, hesitant as are all International
Tribunals to rule a claimant nation out of court, it held that
the Mexican agent had failed to comply with the provisions
of the "Notice Docket" established by the Commission which
required notice to be given to the opposing government of
intention to present the motion, and gave the Mexican agent
leave to withdraw his motion for the present. In a later case
where a similar point was involved the American agent was
given leave to amend. (Moore's Digest, page 2157.)
In the rules of the United States-Mexico General Claims
Commission of 1923 provisions are made for dismissing upon
motion for good cause apparent upon the face of the plead-
ings going to the jurisdiction of the Commission or the merits
of the claim. A number of cases were dismissed for the former
reason when it appeared that they should have been presented
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before the Special Claims Commission of Mexico sitting in
Washington at the same time.
Provisions for the filing of demurrers are found in the
Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871, between the United
States and Great Britain to settle the Alabama Claims, al-
though it is provided that the demurrer shall be sufficient if
it states grounds "without technical nicety". (Moore's Di-
gest, page 2202.) In the rules of the United States-Venezu-
elan Claims Commission of December 5, 1885, there is also
a provision for the filing of demurrers. Generally, however,
the same purpose is accomplished by statements in the counter
cases when filed.
The unique position of the World Court is shown by the
efforts to give to that Court some power of coercion. There
is a class of cases in which compulsory arbitration before the
World Court may be had if the nations involved in the arbi-
tration have acquiesced in the provisions of the treaties cre-
ating the Court which provide for compulsory arbitration.
It may be that the draftsmen of the World Court Statute had
these cases in mind when they prepared Article 41:
"The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circum-
stances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to pre-
serve the rights of either party."
Rule 57 of the Court provides:
"When the Court is not sitting, any measures for the preservation in
the meantime of the respective rights of the parties shall be indicated by the
president. Any refusal by parties to conform to the suggestions of the Court
or of the president with regard to such measures, shall be placed on record."
In the case of Belgium vs. China where it was sought
to enjoin China from abrogating a treaty with Belgium pro-
tecting the rights and property of citizens of the two coun-
tries within the territory of the other, China either refused
or failed to enter into any modus vivendi to protect Belgium
until some new treaty could be entered into and Belgium
sought the aid of the Court under Article 41 above quoted.
The Court thereupon issued an order in which it suggested to
China that the rules contained in the old treaty for the pro-
tection of Belgians and their property should be continued
in force and effect until the decision of the Court should be
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rendered. The Court called attention to the fact that Bel-
gium was still carrying out the provisions of the treaty and
that no order was necessary against that country. What the
effect of this order was the records at hand do not intimate
but some time thereafter China entered into a new treaty and
the case was voluntarily dismissed. (22 A. J. I. L. 2; 24
A. J. I. L. 21.)
The character of the evidence to be used in international
arbitrations has given rise to considerable controversy and
uncertainty. As stated above the usual requirement is that
there shall be attached to the pleadings copies of all docu-
ments, affidavits, etc., upon which reliance is placed. Pro-
vision has also been made in a number of treaties for the
taking of oral testimony and depositions, but generally speak-
ing oral testimony before the tribunals, at least prior to the
World Court, is exceptional. The principal source of con-
troversy, however, has been the status of affidavits, especially
of claimants themselves, or of deceased persons, and the
method of producing evidence of documents which are located
in the archives of the contending governments.
In some cases the treaties creating the tribunals expressly
authorize the presentation of affidavits. In other cases they
have been held admissible under general rules of international
law.
The General Claims Commission under the treaty be-
tween Mexico and the United States, 1923, held that since
under the Hague Convention of 1907, and, under the general
rules of international law, both parties were required to sup-
ply the tribunal with any information which they could obtain,
the tribunals were entitled to give weight to an affidavit in
default of the production of evidence or other affidavits off-
setting it. (Case of Walter H. Faulkner, Docket 47; case
of S. L. Solis, Docket 3245; United States-Mexican Claims
Commission of 1868, Moore's Digest, page 2146.)
The same Commission in another case where the citizen-
ship of a claimant was sought to be established by .the claim-
ant's own affidavit as to his birth in the United States, and the
affidavits of two other persons that they had known him all
his life and knew him "to be an American citizen", held the
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affidavits admissible. (Case of Edgar A. Hatton, Docket
3246.)
The United States-Chile Commission acting under the
treaty of August 7, 1892, which provided that the Commis-
sion "shall be bound to receive and consider all written docu-
ments or statements which may be presented to them" held
that affidavits could be received although the laws of Chile
and of the United States did not contemplate their use in
the domestic courts of those countries:
"Cases may arise in which because of the date of the occurrence, the
impossibility of the party to summon the other party when taking the testi-
mony, and because of the death in the course of time of the witnesses, it may
be impossible to present them for cross examination to the respondent party.
When such circumstances arise it seems reasonable not to reject this kind of
evidence as entirely null and invalid. (Moore's Digest, page 2265.)
In the case of documents in the archives of the contest-
ing governments it is common to provide that certified copies
thereof shall be furnished to the opposing parties. (France-
United States Claims Commission, Treaty of January 15,
1880, Moore's Digest, page 2216; Hague Convention of 1907,
Article 64, United States Treaties, page 2220.) In the case
of the United States-Mexico General Claims Commission of
1923 each agent may advise the other of his desiie to inspect
an original document, and if the request is refused such re-
fusal is to be reported to the Commission which "will take
note thereof". In the case of the Orinoco Steamship Com-
pany vs. Venezuela, arbitrated under the Hague Convention
of 1907, part of the evidence taken to the hearing consisted
of a complete file of the "Gaceta Oficial", or Government
Journal, covering a long period, duly certified under the hand
and seal of the foreign office of Venezuela, to be used in prov-
ing the terms of certain government decrees involved in the
case.
In connection with the consideration of all evidence pre-
sented before arbitral tribunals it seems to be the theory that
if the contesting governments have examined -into the case
before presenting it they must have satisfied themselves that
there is some ground for claim and consequently the tribunals
are justified in giving consideration to evidence of less in-
trinsic value than would be admissible under the rules of law
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prevailing in the trial of cases in domestic tribunals. The
mere fact that a sovereign state is presenting the case lends
weight and credibility to the evidence. In the Weil case
referred to at the beginning of this paper the Mexican agent
pointed out that the proofs submitted by the United States
were of such a character that they could have been easily fab-
ricated, because they were all represented as being copies or
summaries of instruments stolen over twenty years before.
The Mexican agent, however, did not deliberately accuse the
United States of presenting false evidence and no doubt the
fact that the United States had presented it had considerable
influence upon the Commission in accepting it. It is to the
credit of the United States that upon discovering the true facts
it promptly refused to pay the award to the claimant.
In one case before the United States-Mexico General
Claims Commission of 1923 the evidence of the requisitioning
of certain live stock was a receipt the body of which was writ-
ten in pencil, and the signature in ink, by a general of the
Mexican army who had requisitioned five horses and two
mules from an American citizen in Mexico. The pleadings,
however, called for seven horses and no mules, and the Mexi-
can agent charged a variance between the proof and the claim,
and also pointed out the ease with which the pencil portion
of the receipt might have been altered. The Court held,
however, that as the signature was not challenged and no evi-
dence of alteration had been introduced, and as the discrep-
ancy between the claim and the receipt might easily be ex-
plained by the fact that probably the American, citizen was
in no position at the time the receipt was handed to him to
be very critical of its accuracy, the receipt would be accepted
as evidence of the seizure of seven horses.
The World Court Statute (Article 43) provides for the
hearing of witnesses, experts, agents, counsel and advocates.
Whether counsel shall have the right to address the Court be-
fore or after taking the evidence is determined by the Court
(Rule 45) but counsel always have the right to comment upon
the evidence. Each witness is required to take the following
oath, which is of interest because of its non-religious charac-
ter, due presumably to the many religions which may be rep-
resented at the trials before the Court (Rule 50) :
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"I solemnly declare upon my honor and conscience that I will speak the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth."
Oral arguments are frequently but not always provided
for in the agreement of arbitration. The arbitration of the
claim of Alsop & Company vs. Chile was submitted to His
Britannic Majesty, Edward VII. as amiable compositeur, but
no provision was made for oral argument, the case being sub-
mitted on briefs designated as printed arguments. (U. S.
Treaties, page 2508.)
Agents have not usually taken part in the arguments
unless they are also designated as counsel, and this distinction
was pointed out in the proceedings before the Fur Seal Arbi-
tration of 1892 when the American agent, Mr. Foster, started
to read a motion before the Court and the British agent ob-
jected, whereupon Mr. Foster stated, and the Court ruled,
that the agent might make an objection, but counsel must
argue it. (Moore's Digest, page 910.)
It is customary to provide the arbitrators, not with briefs,
but with printed arguments, which are in effect the basis of
the oral arguments, and enable the arbitrators, particularly
those who do not understand the language in which the argu-
ment is to be given, to understand the issues. Some treaties
have provided for printed arguments; some only for oral argu-
ments; some for both. (Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871,
Moore's Digest, page 2203; Hague Convention of 1907, Ar-
ticle 70; World Court Statute, Section 43, and Rule 45.)
In connection with oral argument one of the principal
difficulties in the past has been the determination of the order
in which counsel shall be allowed to speak. Where alternate
pleading has been adopted before Claims Commissions, the
natural sequence of hearing the plaintiff first, and then de-
fendant, seems to be followed. But it is in other cases that
the issues are most apt to be those thought to involve national
interests and honor.
However careful contending governments have been not
to sacrifice their sovereign rights by insisting upon simultane-
ous pleading, the situation inevitably becomes acute in deter-
mining precedence in oral argument for obviously counsel for
both sides cannot talk at once. In the case of the Venezuelan
Preferential Arbitration of 1903 where ten nations were in-
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volved the Court after hearing argument on order of oral
argument, evaded the issue by reverting to the ancient prac-
tice in, diplomatic conferences of providing that the nations
represented should speak in alphabetical order, using the
English forms of their names, and expressly stating that this
decision was not to be construed as deciding which nation
was plaintiff or defendant.
In the case of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbi-
tration where the oral argument lasted forty days and each
government had four counsel to represent it, by agreement
the British Government opened and the United States closed,
counsel for each side speaking alternately.
The rules of the World Court provide that if the parties
do not agree to the order of presentation the Court shall fix
the order. (World Court, Rule 46.)
After the conclusion of the oral argument the case is sub-
mitted and ultimately decided.
The Hague Convention provides that the award must be
rendered in the presence of agents and counsel for both parties
who shall be summoned to hear the same. The World Court
Statute provides (Article 58) that the judgment shall be read
in open court "due notice having been given to the agents".
(Hague Convention of 1907, Article 80.)
One of the fundamental doctrines of international arbi-
tration is that every judgment or award shall contain a state-
ment of the grounds on which it is founded. The Hague Con-
vention of 1907 (Article 79) especially states this rule and
the World Court Statute repeats it. (Article 56.)
Another doctrine is that the decision must be within the
terms of the submission, in other words that the jurisdiction
conferred upon the tribunal shall not be exceeded.
Both of these points seem so obvious to the Anglo-Saxon
mind that it is somewhat surprising that in recent years two
cases have arisen where the United States has felt called upon
to object to the award, and in one case to agree with the
opposing country to disregard it.
In the case of the Chamizal Arbitration between the
United States and Mexico involving the title to a valuable
piece of property in the city of El Paso where the controversy
was caused by changes in the channel of the Rio Grande, the
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award suggested a division of the territory in controversy
along a line which no evidence in the case had supported and
concerning which no claim had been made by either party.
In the case of the arbitration between the United States
and Norway on account of the requisitioning by the United
States of certain Norwegian vessels during the World War,
the United States, while paying the award, called attention
to the fact that the decision had not set forth the basis (n
which the award was determined:
"Indeed, any definite designation or specification of the particular
grounds of the awards to the respective claimants is so entirely lacking that
the award gives to one who examines it no clue to the method of determining
why one amount was awarded rather -than another . . . The inadequacy of
the award in these respects is particularly regretted in view of the require-
ments of article 79 of the Hague Convention of October 18th, 1907, pursuant
to which the Norwegian claims were submitted to arbitration, that the award
must give the reason on which it is based." (Protest of U. S., 17 Amer. J. of
Int. Law, page 289.)
The question of the right to review international awards
has been the subject of much controversy and the practice
seems to establish that applications to Commissions to correct
merely arithmetical errors or erroneous findings of fact which
can be easily and promptly checked, will probably be granted
if made promptly, but in most cases the rendering of the award
terminates and dissolves the tribunal, and it has no further
jurisdiction.
The Hague Convention of 1907 contains a provision that
the right to demand revision may be reserved in the arbitra-
tion agreement of submission if based upon the discovery of
some new fact. (Article 83, U. S. Treaties II: 22,20.)
The World Court Statute (Article 61, Rule 66) provides
for application for revision when "some fact of such a nature
as to be a decisive factor" was not known to the Court and to
the party claiming revision, provided the party was not negli-
gent. Application should be made within six months after
discovery of the new fact, but not after ten years from the
date of judgment.
The costs of arbitration are usually borne jointly by the
nations involved so far as they concern the expenses of the
Court and the payment of the judges; but the cost of pre-
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paring the case must be borne by each government itself un-
less it has some arrangement with the claimant to pay part
or all thereof. The Claims Commissions are therefore of
value in that they keep down the cost of arbitration per case.
The treaty of Washington of 1871 and the United States-
Mexico Claims treaty of 1868 both provided that each award
should be subject to an assessment of not to exceed 5% to pay
the cost of the tribunal; if the cost exceeded this amount the
respective governments were to bear the balance thereof. The
costs of arbitration are usually much too heavy for any indi-
vidual claimant to bear, although where large interests are
involved as in the case of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries
arbitration of 1910 where an entire industry was interested, the
costs are probably not so large in proportion to the interests
involved as might be imagined.
In the Venezuelan Preferential Arbitration of 1903 the
Hague Tribunal held that each of the nine claimant nations
should bear its own costs and an equal share of the costs of
the tribunal, and then said "The government of the United
States is charged with seeing to the execution of this latter
clause within a term of three months". (Penfield's Report,
page 16.)
The World Court Statute (Article 33) provides that the
expenses of that Court are to be borne by the League of Na-
tions in such manner as the assembly shall decide; and (Ar-
ticle 64) that unless otherwise decided by the Court each party
shall bear its own costs.
At the conclusion of the reading of the judgment it has
been customary in past arbitrations, as in opening the pro-
ceedings, for the president of the tribunal to make compli-
mentary and congratulatory comments, and in closing this
paper it may be interesting to note the remarks of Doctor
H. Lammasch, president of the tribunal which heard the
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries arbitration, a man who had
served many times as arbitrator, and who before his death
became president of Austria after the World War. After he,
an Austrian, had listened forty days to arguments wholly in
English, he closed the hearings with:
"There is a noble custom prevailing among the Members of the bar in
Anglo-Saxon countries to address one another as friends, even if they repre-
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sent the adverse parties of a litigation. So Counsel on one side and on the
other have done in this international proceeding.
So much the more it may be my privilege, in the name of the Tribunal,
to address Counsel on both sides as our friends and to thank you for all the
friendly assistance you have lent us during these weeks and months. You
have led us through the maze of a hundred years of diplomatic correspondence,
through the jungle of entangled statutes, through the dark forest of almost
metaphysical problems, in which it was sometimes difficult to see our path,
up to the summit of the mountain, where we hope we may see the problem
we have to deal with in the light of truth and of justice.
I thank you all for the most valuable assistance we have had from your
speeches, for the courtesy you have shown us and especially for the courtesy
you have shown to one another. I am sure that the chivalrous spirit in which
you have treated the grave controversies existing between your countries will
facilitate us to come to a just and happy solution of them." (North Atlantic
Coast Fisheries Arbitration, 1910; Final Report of the Agent of the United
States, page 63.)
This summary has been prepared without present access
to many of the sources which should be consulted in order to
give an exhaustive treatise on this subject, but in the time
allotted to me it would have been difficult to have included
more. I trust the fragments given have been of sufficient in-
terest to justify their presentation without more extensive
citation of authorities.
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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDrroa's Nom-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)
APPEAL AND ERROR-TIME FOR FILING BRIEF-NO. 12514-
Connell vs. Continental Casualty Company, et al-Decided
March 24, 1930.
Facts.-Connell filed a petition in the District Court to
set aside default judgment in a workman's compensation case.
Petition was denied and writ of error was issued November
30, 1929. Plaintiff in error filed his printed abstract January
20, 1930 and his printed brief February 19, 1930. February
21, 1930 two of the defendants in error filed motions to dis-
miss the writ for failure of the plaintiff in error to file his
brief within 15 days after the issuance of the writ, the time
limited by rule 45 in Industrial Commission cases.
Held.-Assuming that this case is governed by rule 45,
the motion to dismiss is denied because the defendants in error
delayed until February 21, 1930 to file their motions, after
plaintiff in error had incurred the expense of having his ab-
stract and brief printed.
Motion Denied.
BANKS AND BANKING-COLLECTION OF CHECKS--NEGLI-
GENCE-NO. 12143-Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
vs. First National Bank of Denver-Decided March 3,
1930.
Facts.-The Amicon Company which had an $8,000.00
checking account in the Ordway State Bank, drew its checks
in this amount and sent them to the Hallack & Howard Lum-
ber Company, which on September 27, 1921 endorsed these
checks and deposited them with the plaintiff for collection,
using deposit slip which provided that plaintiff would not be
liable for negligence or loss incurred in connection with mail
items, and that out-of-town collections not pgid would be
charged back to the account of the depositor.
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Plaintiff credited the checks to the Lumber Company's
account, sent them for collection to defendant, which there-
upon endorsed them and sent them for payment to the Ordway
State Bank on which they were drawn. The Ordway State
Bank received them on September 29, and on October 5, 1921
issued in payment thereof its draft to the Central Savings
Bank & Trust Company, stamped the checks paid and charged
them to the Amicon Company's account. The draft on the
Trust Company was received by defendant through the mail
October 6, presented to the Trust Company and dishonored.
October 8 the Ordway State Bank was closed. Three weeks
later defendant notified plaintiff of this failure of the collec-
tion.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in (1) for-
warding the checks direct to the bank on which they were
drawn, (2) accepting payment in its draft instead of cash, and
(3) delaying nine days in taking any action after the draft
was dishonored.
Held.-In view of all the facts including the circum-
stances under which the Lumber Company deposited the
checks with plaintiff, the defendant was negligent in all three
of the respects complained of, and decisions from other juris-
dictions in which the facts are materially different cannot
govern.
Judgment Affirmed.
CONTRACT TO SELL STOCK - LIMITATIONS- REASONABLE
TIME-NO. 12193-Johnson vs. Johnson-Decided March
10, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff, Arthur C. Johnson, and his brother,
Fred, owned all of the stock of a corporation, Arthur owning
1,501 shares and Fred owning 1,499 shares. In 1919 they
made an agreement that in consideration of Arthur's selling
100 shares to a third party, Fred would sell Arthur 100 shares
at $15.00 a share "at any time considered proper". The object
of the contract was to put the control in Fred during the life-
time of both brothers, but to permit a passing of control to
Arthur at Fred's death. Fred died in 1922. His will, giving
all of his stock to his widow, Marie F. Johnson, was probated
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the same year. The estate was closed in 1926. During the
pendency of the estate proceedings there were various nego-
tiations between Arthur and Foley, the executor, but no defi-
nite results were accomplished until 1927 when Foley wrote
Arthur a letter stating that the 100 shares in question would
not be sold to Arthur. The principal questions are: 1.
Whether this suit for specific performance will lie; 2. Wheth-
er Arthur is estopped on account of certain dealings with de-
fendant; 3. Whether Arthur's claim is barred by the statute
of non-claim, Section 5331, Compiled Laws of 1921; 4.
Whether this suit is barred because of an implied trust; 5.
Whether Arthur exercised the option during its life.
Held.-l. This is the correct form of suit. 2. The estop-
pel was not correctly pleaded. 3. Arthur's demand was not
barred by the statute of non-claim. 4. This is not an implied
trust. 5. There is no finding by the trial court as to whether
the option in the contract was exercised during its life, that
is, within a reasonable time, and the cause is therefore re-
manded for a finding of fact on this point.
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded.
COUNTY COMMISSIONER-CLAIM FOR SERVICES--No. 12275-
Samples vs. Board of County Commissioners, Elbert Coun-
ty, Colorado-Decided March 17, 1930.
Facts.-Samples, a water commissioner, for himself, and
as assignee of one Hall, his deputy, filed claims with the Board
of County Commissioners. Samples' claims named the coun-
ty, bore the respective dates, set forth his capacity as water
commissioner, gave the days when he served and the rate per
day. Hall's claims, however, did not mention the month or
year in which his services were rendered, did not state that
he was a deputy water commissioner, and did not state that
he rendered' services. The trial court disallowed both claims.
The only question is whether any or all of these claims are
in the form required by statute.
Held.-Samples' claims are in substantial accord with
the statute and should be allowed, but Hall's claims were not
made according to law and are, therefore, disallowed.
Judgment Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part.
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CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-DIRECTED VERDICT-INSTRUC-
TIONS-No. 12560-A4dams vs. People-Decided March
10,1930.
Facts.-Adams was found guilty of a second violation of
intoxicating liquor laws. At the trial the evidence showed
that one Culbertson, a prohibition agent, and another had
bought intoxicating liquor from Adams. His counsel asked
the prosecution witness, Culbertson, if he had not been di-
vorced, how long he had been a stool pigeon, etc. This evi-
dence was excluded. Adams, in due course, moved for a
directed verdict. The motion was overruled and defendant
noted an exception, but the motion and the grounds therefor
do not appear in the record. Adams requested an instruction
that uncorroborated evidence of witnesses participating in the
commission of a crime is to be regarded with suspicion.
Held.-Defense counsel's questioning of Culbertson was
inexcusable and the evidence was properly excluded. The
motion for a directed verdict and the exception to the court's
ruling thereon failing to appear in the record, the ruling can-
not be considered on review. The instruction requested by
defendant was improper because the purchase of the liquor
by the prosecution witnesses was not a crime.
Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-PLEA OF GUILTY-RIGHT TO APPEAL-No.
12497-People vs. Brown, et al.-Decided March 31, 1930.
Facts.-Brown was charged with the unlawful possession
of intoxicating liquor before a justice of the peace. He plead-
ed guilty and the minimum fine was assessed.. He appealed
to the county court, and the district attorney moved for dis-
missal on the ground that there was no appeal from such a
judgment of the justice of the peace. The motion was over-
ruled; the district attorney declined to prosecute further and
the defendant was discharged.
Held.-Defendant's only right to appeal was statutory.
The statute does not permit an appeal on this state of facts.
The appeal therefore was a nullity and the judgment of the
justice of the peace still stands.
Judgment Reversed.
DICTA
DECEIT-ELEMENTS--PROOF-NO. 12041-Nelson vs. Van
Schaack & Company-Decided March 3, 1930.
Facts.-Nelson sued the Company to enjoin foreclosure
of deed of trust and for damages for alleged fraudulent rep-
resentations. He was non-suited in the trial court.
In 1926 the parties made a contract for the exchange of
real estate in Denver under which Nelson received a terrace
subject to encumbrance and gave additional encumbrance to
the Company. The suit here is for damages on the ground
that Nelson relied on the Company's statements about the ter-
race and that these statements were false. The evidence
showed that Nelson had been a builder in Denver for 27 years,
that he had examined the terrace, had discussed the matter
with friends and had consulted a realtor about the exchange.
Held.-The facts showed that Nelson did not rely on the
Company's statements. He is, therefore, not entitled to dam-
ages.
Judgment Affirmed.
DEED OF TRUST-FORECLOSURE PRIORITY-No. 12309-Bray
vs. Trower-Decided March 24, 1930.
Facts.-In April, 1919, Trower owned land in Kiowa
County. He agreed to sell the land to Doll, et al, or their
nominee and thereafter executed a warranty deed with the
name of the purchaser left blank, and deposited it with Doll.
The name of one Parks was filled in and he executed a note and
deed of trust for $1,600.00 in favor of Doll. By mesne con-
veyances Bray became the owner of this note and deed of
trust. At the same time the $1,600.00 note was executed Parks
executed another note and deed of trust for $4,800.00 in favor
of Trower. This encumbrance was recorded after the $1,600.00
deed of trust. Encumbrance held by Bray being in default
he brought suit to foreclose, but was stopped by a permanent
injunction issued by the trial court. Trower alleges that his
encumbrance is superior to Bray's because-1. Bray bought
his note after maturity and it is subject to defenses. 2. He,
Trower, was defrauded by Doll. 3. Trower foreclosed his
deed of trust and the public trustee's deed purports to give him
clear title. 4. He did not know of Bray's trust deed till 1926.
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5. His trust deed is a purchase money mortgage and entitled
to precedence. 6. Case is moot because Bray stopped his
foreclosure in accordance with the injunction of the District
Court.
Held.-I. The time of Bray's purchase of the note is im-
material because this is not a suit against the original maker
of the note. 2. Doll's alleged fraud cannot avail Trower in
a suit against Bray. 3. The public trustee's certificate of sale
issued to Trower is specifically subject to Bray's encumbrance
and the public trustee's deed did not change the title taken
by Trower. 4. Trower must have known of Bray's encum-
brance long before 1926. 5. Bray's deed of trust is a purchase
money mortgage as much as Trower's. 6. The case is not
moot because Bray stopped his foreclosure only in obedience
to an injunction.
Judgment Reversed.
DIVORCE-WRIT OF ERROR-No. 12400-Blackmer vs. Black-
mer, et al-Decided March 3, 1930.
Facts.--Plaintiff brought suit for divorce, which was re-
fused by the trial court, whereupon plaintiff appealed.
Held.-In an action for divorce no writ of error lies
where there has been no judgment of divorce.
Writ of Error Dismissed.
IRRIGATION COMPANY-BYLAWS--USE OF WATER-NO. 12249
-Model Land and Irrigation Company vs. Madsen-De-
cided March 3, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff held a large amount of land under the
Desert Entry Act and operated an irrigating canal to concen-
trate the use of certain water on this land. Madsen purchased
certain water stock and attempted to use it on ground distant
from the Model tract.
A bylaw of the company provided that no transfer of
water from one tract to another could be made without the-
approval of the Board of Directors. The Board refused to
approve Madsen's contemplated transfer, but he nevertheless
used the water on his land. The company brought this action
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to restrain such use, was defeated in the lower court and ap-
pealed.




No. 12152-Coun-ty Commissioners, Adams County, et al.
vs. Heath, et al.-Decided March 10, 1930.
Facts.-The North Denver Municipal Irrigation Dis-
trict issued $673,000 of 6% coupon bonds. Heath held four
$500 bonds and one hundred and one $15.00 interest coupons.
The commissioners, in making the levy in 1924 for the tax of
1925, did not increase the rate by 15 per cent of the bonds
then maturing as alleged to be provided by Section 1997 C. L.
1921, and Heath brought mandamus to compel the increase
in levy. The lower court directed that the additional levy
be made.
Held.-The unpaid amount of one year's taxes cannot be
collected by levying an additional 15 per cent upon those who
pay the following years' taxes for the purpose of discharging
the proportionate obligation of those who have not paid. The
provisions of Section 1997, C. L. 1921, may apply to delin-
quencies to cover maintenance, operating and other expenses
of the district, but its provisions cannot be extended beyond
the cost of these items.
Judgment Reversed..
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE-JURISDICTION-WRIT OF PROHIBI-
TION-NO. 12537-Walker, Justice of the Peace, et al vs.
People ex rel. T. M. Uchida-Decided March 10, 1930.
Facts.-Uchida was a resident of Justice Precinct No. 1
in Pueblo. He was served by McAllister with a summons
issued by Walker, Justice of the Peace in Precinct No. 113 in
Pueblo County. Service was made in Precinct No. 1. Uchida
failed to appear and judgment by default was entered against
him. Thereafter McAllister levied on Uchida's property in
Precinct No. 1, and proceeded to advertise it for sale. Uchida
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sued out a Writ of Prohibition in the District Court which
held that the Justice Court judgment was void.
Held.-Although Section 6044 C. L. 1921 provides that
suit should be commenced before justices in the township in
which the defendant resides, the word "township" must be
construed to mean "precinct". The Justice Court, therefore,
had no jurisdiction over Uchida, there was no duty upon him
to appear, judgment is void and the Writ of Prohibition was
properly entered in the District Court.
Judgment Affirmed.
LIABILITY OF SHERIFF-ACT OF DEPUTY-No. 12175-Hubert
L. Corder and The Maryland Casualty Company, a cor-
poration v. The People of the State of Colorado, etc.-De-
cided March 31, 1930.
Facts.-On the evening of October 31, 1926 plaintiff
Smiley and several other boys from the town of Pierce, Colo-
rado, were indulging in Halloween pranks. Defendant Hat-
field, a deputy sheriff, who was a store-keeper in the town,
pursued the boys, warned them to stop their mischief-making;
said that he was deputy sheriff and would make them respect
the law. The boys continued and Hatfield fired several shots,
one of which struck Smiley, who in due course brought this
action against Corder and the Casualty Company, the official
surety on Corder's bond as sheriff. Defendants contended that
there was no competent evidence that Hatfield was acting in
an official capacity and the case was submitted to a jury which
found for Smiley.
Held.-There was sufficient evidence to go to the jury
and the verdict is sustained.
Judgment Affirmed.
POSSESSION OF REALTY-HOMESTEAD--NO. 12039-Vassek vs.
Moffat County Mercantile Corporation-Decided March
3,1930.
Facts.-Mercantile Company brought an action against
defendant below (plaintiff here) to recover possession of
farm lands. The defendant, Ignatz Vassek, had taken the
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necessary steps to secure to him a homestead right in the lands
in question. Thereafter defendant's wife, Rosa Vassek, be-
came ill and they left the State of Colorado for about six
months, during which time their six minor children remained
in the house on the disputed lands.
Mercantile Company alleged that the absent defendants
were not in possession.
Held.-Under these facts the defendants, Ignatz and
Rosa Vassek were in such possession as is contemplated by the
statute giving homestead rights, and they are, therefore, en-
titled to the benefits of the statute.
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded.
PERSONAL PROPERTY- SALE- DESCRIPTION - No. 12296-
Denver and Salt Lake Railway vs. Hitchcock and Tinkler
Equipment Co.-Decided March 3, 1930.
Facts.-Defendant here, plaintiff below, brought an ac-
tion for damages for the conversion of personalty. The prop-
erty belonged originally to the Moffat Tunnel Commission,
which entered into a lease with defendant covering the Moffat
Tunnel approaches, tracks, etc., "together with all other prop-
erty rights, easements and appurtenances connected with said
Railroad Company, its approaches and equipment . . . that
may be useful, incident or convenient for the use and opera-
tion of said Railroad Tunnel." Thereafter the Commission
advertised for sale the property here involved and executed
a bill of sale to plaintiff covering it.
Held.-The evidence for trial showed that the property
in question was not "useful, incident or convenient for the use
and operation of said Railroad Tunnel." It was, therefore,




-American Medical and Dental Ass'n. vs. Grant-Decid-
ed March 10, 1930.
Facts.-Grant executed a promissory note dated March
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1, 1918, in the amount of $165.00, payable to A. J. Pate, and
containing this clause: "The makers and endorsers hereof
* * * agree to any extensions of time payment and partial
payments before, at or after maturity." On the reverse side
appeared the following: "Payment of this note is hereby ex-
tended to Sept. 1st, 1924." (Signed) A. J. Pate. There also
appeared Pate's endorsement to the plaintiff in error. Grant
denied the making of any extension agreement and affirma-
tively pleaded the statute of limitations.
Held.-The association having pleaded an extension of
time, the burden was upon it to establish this fact. An exten-
sion of a note cannot be made without an actual agreement.
No agreement having been proved here, the note is barred.
Judgment Affirmed.
RELIGIOUS CORPORATION'S SUIT BY MEMBERS--No. 12156-
German Evangelical Emmaus Church vs. Free Evangelical
Emmaus Church-Decided March 24,1930.
Facts.-Ehlrich, et al, as members of plaintiff congrega-
tion brought this suit in the name of the corporation to pre-
vent defendants occupying a certain church property. The
complaint alleges plaintiff is an incorporated congregation
subject to The German Evangelical Snyod of North America
and that according to the rules of said synod the church coun-
sel is responsible for the property; that the 1926 dissension
arose between Kauerz, then pastor of said congregation, and
certain members; that Kauerz and his followers withdrew
from the synod and organized a new church, but continued
in possession of the old church building. The evidence shows
that Ehlrich and his supporters are a small minority of the
congregation and that they did not demand that the church
counsel act in their behalf or that such a demand would be
unavailing.
Held.-Ehlrich and his supporters have no right to bring
a suit in behalf of the religious corporation without proving
that the officers thereof had refused to bring a suit, or that a
demand would be futile.
Judgment Affirmed.
DICTA
TAXATION-LIVESTOCK-AGREEMENT WITH THE COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS-NO. 12172-Boyer Bros., Inc. vs. Board
of County Commissioners, etc.-Decided March 31, 1930.
Facts.-Boyer Bros., Inc., engaged in sheep raising in
Wyoming, grazed its sheep on the United States forest reserve
in Routt County parts of each year from 1918 to 1923. In
1916 the company made a written agreement with the county
commissioners providing that the company should be assessed
each year on one-third of the number of sheep brought to
Routt County for grazing. In 1921 the legislature passed an
act (C. L. 1921 Section 7249), providing that when personal
property is brought into the state after April 1 of any year
and is removed before April 1 of the following year, the owner
shall file a schedule with the county assessor, and shall be liable
for a pro rata tax based on that portion of the year in which
the taxable chattels are in the county. Boyer Bros. brought
this action to recover taxes paid under their agreement with
the commissioners for the years from 1918 to 1923. The lower
court gave judgment for the defendants for all these years.
Held-Prior to 1921 there was no basis for the taxation
agreement, Boyer Bros. derived no benefit therefrom, and
they are therefore entitled to recover. Beginning with 1921,
however, the statute made it the duty of the assessor to levy
a tax "according to the best information he can obtain". The
judgment in favor of the commissioners for the years 1921 to
1923 was therefore correct..
Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part.
Board of County Commissioners of Routt County vs. Routt
County Live Stock Co.-No. 12173-Decided March 31,
1930.
Board of County Commissioners of Routt County vs. Kipp
Sheep Co.-No. 12174-Decided March 31, 1930.
These are companion cases to 12172 and the facts and
holdings are substantially the same.
DICTA
TAX SALE CERTIFICATES-RIGHTS OF PURCHASER-No. 12000
-Ireland vs. Collins, et al. and Gunnison Mountain Coal
and Coke Co.-On Rehearing-Decided March 3, 1930.
Facts.-Certain property of the Coal and Coke Company
went to tax sale in 1922 and 1923, and was struck off to
Gunnison County which transferred the certificates to plain-
tiff. The County Treasurer later issued tax deeds on part of
the certificates, and as to the tracts included therein plaintiff
brought ejectment, which was defeated below.
The principal question involved is the amount to which
plaintiff is entitled on the cancellation of these deeds and cer-
tificates,-the amount on the face of the certificates plus spe-
cific taxes and penalties or only the amount which plaintiff
actually paid for them with the usual legal interest.
Held.-The deeds are void, and plaintiff took nothing
but a lien to the extent of the payment of the amount paid for
the certificates, with legal interest thereon. Such payments
by plaintiff did not discharge the tax in full but only so much
thereof as was covered by the money actually received by the
County, the balance of the tax remaining a lien on the prop-
erty.
Judgment Affirmed.
WARRANTY DEED-DEED OF TRUST-CANCELLATION-FRAUD
-No. 12140-Klein et al vs. Munz, as Executor of estate of
Margaret A. Chatterton-Decided March 17, 1930.
Facts.-Chatterton, on November 16, 1925, executed and
delivered to E. R. Kuhlmann a warranty deed with the
grantee's name left blank. Kuhlmann first inserted the name
of one Danielson, then the name of one Petrone, and then
the name of Lola Kuhlmann, his wife; the latter executed a
note and trust deed on the property and these papers were,
in ordinary course, bought by Klein, who sold them to Fields.
Thereafter Chatterton died and her executor brought this ac-
tion to cancel the warranty deed and the deed of trust. The
district court held both instruments void and ordered them
cancelled.
Held.-If there was fraud in Kuhlmann having filled in
his wife's name in the warranty deed, it was made possible by
DICTA
Chatterton. Her executor stands in the same position as
Chatterton, and it is, therefore, correct to apply the rule that,
when one of two innocent persons must suffer from a fraud,
the one who has made the fraud possible should suffer.
Judgment Reversed.
WATER PRIORITIES-CHANGE OF USE-POINT OF DIVERSION-
No. 12171-Baker, et al. vs. City of Pueblo, et al.-Decided
March 31, 1930.
Facts.-The City of Pueblo filed its petition seeking a
decree permitting it to change the points of diversion of cer-
tain waters of the Arkansas River. Plaintiffs in error, junior
appropriators from the same stream, appeared and objected
to the petition. The ditches in question are in two groups:
the general decree for the first providing that the appropria-
tors shall have the right to use the water continuously for
irrigating purposes, and the general decree for the second
group providing priorities without giving the right to a con-
tinuous flow. The City of Pueblo sought to change the use
of water from agricultural to domestic. The lower court
awarded the city the right to change the point of diversion of
all the water flowing through the first group of ditches, but
only one-fourth of the water flowing through the second
group.
Held.-The rights of junior appropriators must be care-
fully guarded. The evidence was that the plaintiffs in error
would be damaged by the change of use of diversion of the
water flowing in both groups of ditches; furthermore, the
continuous flow provided in the general decree for the first
group must be construed to mean only a continuous flow for
these waters insofar as they are needed for agricultural pur-
poses, and does not contemplate a continuous flow day and
night for domestic purposes.
Decree Reversed.
WATER PRIORITIES-INDIVIDUAL DECREES-LIMITATIONS-
No. 12232-Kibbee vs. Kostelic-Decided March 10, 1930.
Facts.-There was a general decree for priorities in
Water District No. 11, in which neither Pledger (Kibbee's
DICTA
grantor) nor Kostelic appeared. Thereafter, in 1910, Pledger
obtained an individual decree with priority as of March 20,
1898. Kostelic did not appear in this action. In 1927 Kostelic
filed his individual petition asserting a priority from the same
stream, as of May 1, 1886. Kibbee appeared and objected to
Kostelic's claim on the grounds: (1) That Kostelic's claims
could not be determined in his individual proceeding because
his claims arose before the entry of the general decree. (2)
That Kostelic's petition contained insufficient descriptions of
ditches, owners, etc. (3) That Kostelic's claim was barred
by limitation; and (4) Because the evidence was insufficient
to warrant a decree in Kostelic's favor.
Held.-Kostelic's right of action, if any, is barred by
Section 1785, C. L. 1921, which provides a four-years period
of limitation from the time of the entry of a final priority
decree, and also by Section 1789, C. L. 1921, dealing with
arguments and reviews. Both of the above statutes apply to
individual as well as to general priority decrees. It was,
therefore, error for the district court to award Kostelic a
priority superior to that of Kibbee.
Judgment Reversed.
WILLS AND ESTATES-DISTRIBUTION-APPEALABLE INTER-
EST-No. 12506-Fenn, et al. vs. Knauss, et al.-Decided
March 3, 1930.
Facts.-About three and one-half months after Warneke's
will had been probated and letters testamentary issued, the
specific legatees filed a petition asking that their legacies be
paid, alleging that all demands had been paid and tendering
repayment bonds. The executors resisted the petition on the
grounds that one year from the issuance from probate had not
run and that they were entitled to the protection afforded by
the lapse of this time.
The County Court ordered the executors to pay the lega-
cies. The executors appealed to the District Court, which re-
versed the order of the County Court.
Held.-The executors had no appealable interest in the
order of the County Court and their appeal must be dismissed.
DICTA
However, the court does not approve of orders like this, or-
dering payments of legacies in less than one year from the
issuance of letters.
Judgment Reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-
"HORSE-PLAY"-NO. 12512-McKnight vs. Houck, and
Industrial Commission of Colorado-Decided March 17,
1930.
Facts.-McKnight, plaintiff's son, while employed on the
ranch of Dr. Houck was instructed by Houck to go with one
Arnot, a fellow employe, to count some cattle and to take their
pistols to kill any stray dogs or coyotes. On their return to
the bunk-house they undertook to see which of them could
draw his pistol first. In doing this McKnight was killed.
The District Court held that the killing did not arise in the
course of employment.
Held.-The District Court was correct and the so-called
"doctrine of horse-play" does not exist.
Judgment Affirmed.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS--ABSENCE FROM STATE-RETRO-
ACTIVE EFFECT-NO. 12170-Jones v. O'Connell-Decided
February 17, 1930.
Facts.-O'Connell sued Jones to recover on a promissory
note which became due November 22, 1912, and time of pay-
ment was never extended. Suit was instituted May 27, 1927,
fifteen years after its maturity. Last payment was made on
the note about five years after its maturity and about ten years
before suit was brought. Defense was the Statute of Limita-
tions. Judgment against Jones below.
Held.-I. Actions on promissory notes must be com-
menced within six years next after the cause of action thereon
shall accrue.
2. The Act of 1921, among other things, provided that
if when a cause of action accrues against a person, he is out
of the State, or has absconded or concealed himself, the period
limited for the commencement of the action by any Statute
DICTA
of Limitations shall not begin to run until he comes into the
State, or while he is so absconded or concealed, and if, after
the cause of action accrues he departs from the State, or ab-
sconds, or conceals himself, the time of his absence or conceal-
ment shall not be included as a part of the period in which
the action must be brought.
3. In this case, the defendant was absent from Colorado
from about June, 1920, and thereafter had his permanent domi-
cile in California. The six years had elapsed before the com-
plaint in this action was filed, and unless the defendant's
(Jones') absence from Colorado suspended the running of the
six year statute, the judgment below was wrong, but,
4. There is no express provision in the Statute of 1921
making it operative as to past transactions. Therefore, the
Statute of 1921 does not affect the rights of the plaintiff or
defendant in this case.
Judgment Reversed.
VENUE-INSURANCE-NO. 12440-Progressive Mutual In-
surance Company v. Mihoover-Decided Feb. 3, 1930.
Facts.-Mihoover commenced this action against the In-
surance Company, a domestic corporation, to recover upon
accident insurance policy issued by the Insurance Company
upon the life of the plaintiff's husband in which policy the
plaintiff was named as beneficiary. The plaintiff resides in
Pueblo County where her husband formerly lived. The ap-
plication for insurance was made in Pueblo County and the
premiums were there paid, and the husband died there. The
defendant resides in the City and County of Denver where
its principal and only place of business is maintained. Notice
of process was had upon it in Denver. Defendant made ap-
plication for a change of venue below which was denied.
Held.-l. The contract of insurance is silent as to the
place-of performance in event of loss under the terms of the
policy.
2. Where the contract is silent as to the place of pay-
ment the debtor is obliged to seek the creditor in the County
of his residence and at his usual place of business or abode
and make payment to him there.
DICTA
3. In the absence of a special provision in the policy
of insurance, the county in which the plaintiff resides is a
proper county in which to commence an action to collect
thereon.
Judgment Affirmed.
WIDOW'S ALLOWANCE - ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACT - No.
12468-Popham vs. Duncan-Decided February 24, 1930.
Facts.-Plaintiff in error is the administrator, and de-
fendant in error is the widow of Charles M. Duncan. Duncan
and his wife made an ante-nuptial agreement that they might
separate at any time, that he would pay her $100.00 for each
year they would have lived together, and that she would waive
her right as a widow, in the event of his death. In less than
one year from the agreement they separated; he paid her
$110.00 and she executed a receipt in full. After his death
she claimed a widow's allowance, which the County Court
denied, but which the District Court, on appeal, allowed.
Held.-The alleged ante-nuptial contract is against pub-
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